Pakala Narayana Swami vs King Emperor

Abstract

This case clarifies the principles for identifying a confession and a dying declaration.

The Privy Council stated that a confession is a statement made by the accused wherein he admits to the terms of the offence, or substantially admits to all the facts of the offence, or a statement which suggests an inference that the accused committed the crime.

The Privy Council clarified that even though an accused makes a statement which admits to incriminating facts, that in itself does not make the statement a confession. Furthermore, if an accused makes a statement which contains self-exculpatory or self-explanatory matter, such a statement cannot amount to a confession.

The Court also clarified that the statement of a deceased which explains the transaction that resulted in his death, is admissible as a dying declaration under section 32(1) of the Indian Evidence Act, notwithstanding that the deceased had no expectation of death at the time he made the statement.

 

 

Facts of The Case- 

The accused, Pakala Narayana Swami, appealed to the Privy Council against the judgment of the Honourable High Court of Pana which affirmed the conviction and death sentence of the accused by the Session Judge of Berhampur. The accused sought the Privy Council to set aside the said conviction and death sentence.

 

The deceased, Kuree Nakarju, was murdered. His body was severed into seven pieces and placed in a steel trunk which was abandoned in a third-class compartment of a train at Puri, at the terminus of a branch line on the Bengal Nagpur Railway. The deceased’s body was identified by his widow.

 

At the trial, the prosecution laid evidence of the fact that the accused was married to the deceased’s daughter. The accused and his wife resided at Berhampur. In 1933, the accused and his wife borrowed the sum of Rs.3000 from the deceased to be repaid at an interest rate of 18% per annum. Evidence of letters and notes bearing the accused’s wife’s signature proved the existence of this transaction.

 

On the 20^th day of March, 1937, the deceased received an unsigned note inviting him to come over to Berhampur the following day. Before leaving his house, the deceased showed his wife the letter and informed her that the accused’s wife (i.e. the deceased’s daughter) had invited him to come receive the payment of the loan owed to him. On the 21^st of March, 1937, the deceased left his house and boarded a train to Berhampur.

 

On the 23^rd of March, 1937, the deceased’s body was found, severed into pieces, inside a steel trunk abandoned in a third-class compartment of a train at Puri.

 

The accused was arrested in connection with the crime and was charged to court for the murder of the deceased.

 

In his statement, the accused admitted that the deceased came to his house on the 21^st of March, 1937. According to him, the deceased arrived in the evening of that day, slept over in the accused’s house, and in the evening of the next day, the deceased left the accused’s house to board the evening train back home.

 

The deceased also stated that on the 23^rd of March, he had some private business to attend to so, he boarded a morning train to Chattarpur to meet up with his business.

 

The trial court found the accused guilty of the crime, convicted him, and passed a death sentence on him. The accused appealed to the High Court against the trial court’s decision, and the High Court affirmed the conviction and death sentence. Still aggrieved, the accused appealed to the Privy Council. The Privy Council found merit in the appeal and set aside the decision of the lower courts. The accused was discharged and acquitted of the conviction and death sentence.

 

2.0     Issues Raised

The issues raised were as follows:

1. Whether the statement of the accused is a confession?

 

1. Whether the statement made by the deceased to his wife is a dying declaration?

 

3.0     Judgment

The Privy Council set aside the decision of the lower court. In doing so, the Court made some observations which are necessary for identifying a confessional statement, and a dying declaration.

 

• On whether the statement of the accused amounts to a confession.

 

The Privy Council held that the accused’s statement was partly a confession, and partly explanatory of his innocence. From the observations of Lord Atkin, the following points are very important for identifying a confessional statement:

 

• A confessional statement must contain an admission of the terms of the offence or, a substantial admission of all the facts which constitute the offence.

 

• A statement by an accused which suggests the inference that he committed the crime could be construed as a confession.

 

 

• Merely admitting a gravely incriminating fact, even a conclusively incriminating fact, cannot in itself make such statement a confession.

 

• An accused’s statement which contains self-exculpatory or self-explanatory matter cannot be a confession.

 

• On Whether the Deceased’s Statement was a Dying Declaration?

The statement of the accused to his wife that he was invited by the accused’s wife to come to Berhampur to collect his loan, was held by the court to be a dying declaration. According to the Court, the statement explains the transaction which resulted in his death.

 

The court clarified that the when a deceased makes a dying declaration, it is not mandatory that the deceased should make such statement on the expectation of death.

 

As long as a statement made by a deceased explains the circumstances of the deceased’s death, such statement is relevant even if at the time of making the statement, the deceased had no cause to believe that he was going to die.

 

The deceased’s statement was admissible as a dying declaration under section 32(1) of the Indian Evidence Act.

 

4.0     Relevance of the Judgment

 

• On Confession

 

Confession, whether judicial, extra-judicial or self-confession, is an admission. Where a court has grounds to belief that a confession is true and voluntary, the Court can convict an accused based on the confessional statement, even in the absence of a corroborative evidence.

 

However, for a confession to ground a conviction, amongst other requirements, it must be an admission of facts which constitute the offence.

 

From the case at hand, it is clear that even if an accused admits to certain facts of an allegation, no matter how incriminating the facts may be, that in itself is not tantamount to an admission that the accused committed the offence. If the accused’s statement partly explains his innocence, that statement cannot be a confession.

 

Thus, a prosecution which seeks to rely on the statement of an accused as a confession must ensure that the statement meets the following:

1. Statement is made voluntarily.
2. Statement is clear, consistent and convincing.
3. Statement must be one which can be taken as a whole.
4. Statement contains an admission by the accused that he committed the crime; or that he substantially admits to all the facts which constitute the offence
5. Statement does not contain any self-explanatory or self-exculpatory matter i.e. facts which explain the accused’s innocence.
6. Statement must suggest an inference that the accused committed the crime.

 

• On Dying Declarations

 

Dying declarations are ‘words said before death’. By virtue of section 32(1) of the Indian Evidence Act, a statement made by a person which explains the cause of his death or any circumstances of the transaction which resulted in his death is a dying declaration. The statement could be made orally, with gestures and signs, and in writing.

 

Because dying declarations are exceptions to the hearsay rule, one of the general presumptions which surround the admissibility of these kind of statements is that

• A person who makes a statement in the expectation of his death cannot lie. In other words, a person who reasonably believes that he is about to die would not lie.

 

Thus, generally, dying declarations are associated with words made by persons who reasonably anticipate that they are about to die.

 

However, in the present case, at the time the deceased made the statement to his wife, he did not anticipate his death. But the statement explained the circumstances of the transaction surrounding his death, as required under section 32(1) of the Indian Evidence Act.

Thus, even though the general presumption of ‘expectation of death’ did not apply in this case, the statement still qualified under section 32(1), and was admissible as a dying declaration under the section.

 

Therefore, statements which are made by deceased persons who did not expect their deaths are still admissible in evidence as dying declarations as long as such statements meet the requirement of section 32(1) of the Indian Evidence Act.